He stared at me in total shock. This, I thought, was simply too easy; the man was pathetic. He could at least put up more of a struggle. I wasn't even going to have to pay him.
'Oh, dear God,' he said, with a tremble in his voice. 'Who are you?'
'As I say, I work for
I had expected a few moments of bargaining, at least, but instead he just crumpled up, hands shaking.
'I knew something like this would happen, sooner or later,' he said. 'I just knew it . . .'
'Well, you were right,' I replied brutally. 'It has. So just count yourself lucky that all I want is harmless information, nothing else.'
He glanced around him, somewhat in the way you might if you felt your employer could be hovering nearby, watching and listening.
'Come and take a little stroll,' I said. 'I do not think there is anyone who will see you talking to me. And I will never reveal anything at all. Word of a journalist, if you doubt my honour.'
He sighed heavily, and gave in. The surrender was complete, and I could see that he would now tell me anything I asked him. My opinion of him was not high. I would have thought better of him had he tried to run, or hit me first.
'So, let's begin. The Argentinian loan. Why is your bank not participating? Was that your decision?'
'Oh no. Not me. I am not sufficiently senior to decide a thing like that. I would never dare defy Barings on my own authority. I arrange the practicalities of taking up a subscription, I do not decide what we subscribe to.'
'So? Who does decide?'
'Normally there is a committee which evaluates each issue. In this case, it was a decision taken by the Chairman alone.'
'And that is unusual?'
'That is unheard of.'
'How did it happen?'
He looked around, nervously once more. 'I was told to write a letter refusing to take part. And also instructed to give no reasons why this decision had been taken. Again, this is unusual. It is normally a matter of courtesy to give an explanation, even if it is informal.'
'And, again, it was the Chairman who gave you these instructions?'
'Yes. He summoned me personally. I asked why, as in the past Barings' business has been very profitable. All he said was that this time no one was going to take part. Not a single institution in France was going to touch it.'
'Why not?'
'Exactly what I asked. Was there something wrong with it? I asked. But no, he said there was nothing particularly wrong with it. That was why Barings was going to get such a shock. And more than Barings, he said.'
'And what did he mean by that?'
'He said no more. But it puzzled me, as I can see it puzzles you. So I listened, you see, and asked questions of my colleagues at other banks. And do you know what I discovered?'
He was positively voluble now, willing to tell me things I hadn't even asked.
'I've no idea.'
'It was true. All the big banks in France will refuse to take any Barings paper. Not only that, I know of two banks in Belgium, and one in Russia, which will also turn it down.'
'How much is this issue?'
'In all, about five million pounds. A very great deal of money, but no more than many South American issues and with better prospects than many. Of course, you can argue that too much money has been put into Argentina, and I would sympathise with that view. Sooner or later the markets will have had enough. But if you want to reduce your liability, then this is a foolish way of going about it.'
'Why so?' I knew the answer to that already, but also knew that the more he told me, the more he would tell me. He hadn't even noticed I wasn't taking any notes.
'Because we hold a substantial amount of South American bonds, and our customers have bought more off us. A failure could panic the whole sector and drive down prices across the board. We could lose a great deal of money. It would be much more sensible to sell off stock first.'
'And that has not been done?'
'There has been some selling, but not enough.'
If South American bonds collapsed, then French institutions would lose money, that was true. But nowhere near as much as English ones would lose. Of all the bonds sold in the past decade, since Barings discovered South America, at least half the value had been sold in England, the rest had to be spread across Europe and North America. I could not call the figures to mind, although it was obvious that it would send a shockwave through the markets. But nothing that the City could not cope with. The American railroad collapse had been just as severe, but had been surmounted without much difficulty. And the effect would run right the way across the Continent. Why would banks connive at conjuring up losses unnecessarily? As M. Hubert said, there were much more sensible ways of getting out of markets you feared might be nearing their peak. Bringing them down while you were still fully exposed was foolish, to say the least.
