To this end, the Bolsheviks engineered later in the day a mini-putsch in the Workers’ Section. Here, as in the Soldiers’ Section, they were in a minority. The Bolshevik faction requested the Ispolkom on very short notice to convene an extraordinary session of the Workers’ Section for 3 p.m. This allowed no time to contact all the SR and Menshevik members of the section: the Bolsheviks, however, made certain that their members turned up in a body, which assured them of a momentary majority. Zinoviev opened the meeting with a demand that the Soviet assume full governmental power. The Menshevik and SR deputies on hand opposed him and asked the Bolsheviks instead to help stop the Machine Gun Regiment. When the Bolsheviks refused, the Mensheviks and SRs walked out, leaving their rivals in full control. They elected a Bureau of the Workers’ Section, which duly passed a resolution presented by Kamenev, the opening sentence of which read:
In view of the crisis of authority, the Workers’ Section deems it necessary to insist that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies take power in its hands.151
Of course, no such “All-Russian Congress” existed, even on paper. The message was clear: the Provisional Government was to be overthrown.
This accomplished, the Bolsheviks departed for Kshesinskaia’s for a meeting of the Central Committee. At 10 p.m., as the meeting was about to start, a column of the mutinous troops drew near. According to Communist sources, Nevskii and Podvoiskii, speaking from the balcony, urged them to return to their barracks, for which they were booed.* The Bolsheviks were still wavering. They were itching to move, but they worried about the reaction to a coup of front-line troops, among whom, despite vigorous propaganda, they had managed to win over only a few regiments, most notably the Latvian Rifles. The bulk of the combat forces remained loyal to the Provisional Government. Even the mood of the Petrograd garrison was far from certain.152 Still, the intensity of the disorders and the news that thousands of Putilov workers, accompanied by wives and children, were gathering in front of Taurida overcame their hesitations. At 11:40 p.m., by which time the rioting troops had returned to their barracks and calm had been restored to the city, the Central Committee adopted a resolution calling for the overthrow of the Provisional Government by armed force:
Having considered the events currently taking place in Petrograd, the meeting concludes: the present crisis of authority will not be resolved in the interests of the people if the revolutionary proletariat and garrison do not, at once, firmly and unequivocally, declare that they favor the transfer of power to the Soviet of Workers’, Soldiers’, and Peasants’ Deputies.
To this end, it is recommended that the workers and soldiers at once take to the streets to demonstrate the expression of their will.153
The Bolshevik objective was unequivocal, but their tactics, as always, were cautious and left room for a face-saving retreat. Mikhail Kalinin, a participant in these events, thus describes the party’s position.
Responsible party workers faced a delicate question: “What is this—a demonstration or something more? Perhaps the beginning of a proletarian revolution, the beginning of a power seizure?” This appeared important at the time, and they especially badgered [Lenin]. He would answer: “We will see what happens; now one can’t tell anything!” … This was, indeed, a review of the revolutionary forces, their numbers, quality, and activism.… This review could turn into a decisive encounter: everything depended on the correlation of forces and any number of chance occurrences. In any event, as if for purposes of insurance against unpleasant surprises, the commander’s order was: “We will see.” This in no way precluded the possibility of throwing the regiments into battle if the correlation of forces proved favorable or, on the other hand, of retreating with the least possible losses, which is what actually happened on July 4.*
The Central Committee entrusted the management of its operation scheduled for the next day, July 4, to the Military Organization, with Podvoiskii in charge.154 Podvoiskii and his associates spent the night communicating with pro-Bolshevik military units and factories, advising them of the pending action and giving them marching orders. Kronshtadt received a call from Bolshevik headquarters at Kshesinskaia’s requesting troops.155 The armed manifestation was to begin at 10 a.m.156
