On July 4, Pravda appeared with a large empty space on its front page: visible evidence of the removal the preceding night of an article by Kamenev and Zinoviev urging restraint.157 The role of Lenin in these decisions, if any, cannot be determined. Bolshevik historians insist that he was enjoying the peace and quiet of the Finnish countryside, oblivious of what his colleagues were doing. He is said to have first learned of the Bolshevik action at 6 a.m. on July 4 from a courier, following which he immediately left for the capital in the company of Krupskaia and Bonch-Bruevich. This version seems unconvincing in view of the fact that Lenin’s followers never undertook any action which he did not personally approve: certainly not action which carried such immense risks. It is also known from Sukhanov (see below) that during the night preceding the riots, Lenin wrote an article for Pravda on the subject: this was almost certainly “All Power to the Soviets,” which the paper printed on July 5.158

The Provisional Government had known as early as July 2 what the Bolsheviks were up to. On July 3 it contacted the headquarters of the Fifth Army in Dvinsk to request troops. None were forthcoming, at least in part because the socialists in the Soviet, whose approval was essential, hesitated to authorize resort to force.159 In the early hours of July 4, General P. A. Polovtsev, the new commander of the Petrograd Military District, posted announcements forbidding armed demonstrations and “suggesting” to the garrison troops that they help preserve order.160 The Military Staff surveyed the forces available to suppress street disorders and found them to be all but nonexistent: 100 men of the Preobrazhenskii Guard Regiment, one company from the Vladimir Military Academy, 2,000 Cossacks, and 50 war invalids. The rest of the garrison had no desire to become involved in a conflict with the mutinous troops.161

July 4 began peacefully: only the eerie silence of the deserted streets suggested something was brewing. At 11 a.m., soldiers of the Machine Gun Regiment, accompanied by Red Guards in automobiles, occupied key points in the city. At the same time, 5,000 to 6,000 armed sailors from Kronshtadt disembarked in Petrograd. Their commander, Raskolnikov, later expressed surprise that the government did not stop his force by sinking one or two of the boats from shore batteries.162 The sailors were under instructions to proceed from the landing pier near Nikolaevskii Bridge directly to Taurida. But as they lined up, a Bolshevik emissary told them that orders had been changed and they were to go instead to Kshesinskaia’s. The protests of the SRs present were ignored, and the SR Maria Spiridonova, who had come to address the sailors, was left without an audience. Preceded by a military band and carrying banners reading “All Power to the Soviets,” the sailors, drawn out in a long column, crossed Vasilevskii Island and the Stock Exchange Bridge to the Alexander Park, from where they continued to Bolshevik headquarters. There they were addressed from the balcony by Iakov Sverdlov, Lunarcharskii, Podvoiskii, and M. Lashevich. Lenin, who had arrived at Kshesinskaia’s a short time before, displayed an uncharacteristic reluctance to speak. At first, he refused to address the sailors on the grounds that he was not well, but he finally yielded and delivered a few brief remarks. Hailing the sailors, he told them that

he was happy to see what was happening, how the theoretical slogan, launched two months earlier, calling for the passage of all power to the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies was now being translated into reality.163

Even these cautious words could leave no doubt in anyone’s mind that the Bolsheviks were engaged in a coup d’état. It was to be Lenin’s last public appearance until October 26.

The sailors marched off to Taurida. What transpired inside Bolshevik headquarters after their departure is known from Sukhanov, who was told by Lunacharskii:

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