Not all the action occurred at Taurida. While the mobs were converging on the seat of the Soviet, small armed detachments directed by the Military Organization occupied strategic points. Bolshevik prospects improved considerably when the garrison of the Peter and Paul Fortress, 8,000 strong, went over to them. Motorized Bolshevik units took over the plants of several anti-Bolshevik newspapers; anarchists seized the most outspoken of them,
The stage was thus set for a formal takeover: nominally in the name of the Soviet, in reality on behalf of the Bolsheviks. In preparation for this crowning event the Bolsheviks had arranged for a delegation of handpicked “representatives” of fifty-four factories to call on Taurida with a petition demanding the Soviet assume power. These men forced their way into the room occupied by the Ispolkom. Several of them were allowed to speak. Martov and Spiridonova supported their demand: Martov declared that such was the will of history.168 At this point it seemed that the rioters would physically inundate and take over the seat of the Soviet. The Soviet had no defense against this threat: its total protection consisted of six guards.169
And yet the Bolsheviks failed to deliver the coup de grace. It is impossible to tell whether this was due to poor organization, indecisiveness, or both. Nikitin blamed the Bolshevik failure to take power on poor planning.
The uprising was improvised: all the actions of the enemy indicated that it had not been prepared. The regiments and large units did not know their immediate missions even in the main area. They were told from the balcony of Kshesinskaia’s: “Go to Taurida Palace, take power.” They went and while awaiting the promised further orders commingled with one another. By contrast, units of ten to fifteen men in trucks and armored cars and small detachments in automobiles enjoyed complete freedom of action, lorded it over the city, but they, too, received no concrete orders to take over the strongpoints such as railroad stations, telephone centers, supply depots, arsenals, the doors to all of which stood wide open. The streets flowed with blood, but there was no leadership …*
But in the ultimate analysis the Bolshevik failure seems to have been caused by factors other than inadequate forces or bad planning: contemporaries agree that the city was theirs for the asking. Rather, it was due to a last-minute failure of nerve on the part of the commander in chief. Lenin simply could not make up his mind: according to Zinoviev, who spent these hours by his side, he kept wondering aloud whether this was or was not the time to “try,” and in the end decided it was not.170 For some reason he could not summon the courage to make the leap: possibly the dark cloud which hung over him of government revelations about dealings with the Germans held him back. Later, when both of them sat in jail, Trotsky told Raskolnikov, in what Raskolnikov took to be veiled criticism of Lenin: “Perhaps we made a mistake. We should have tried to take power.”171
When these events were taking place, Kerensky was at the front. The frightened ministers did nothing. The roar of thousands of armed men in front of Taurida, the sight of vehicles with soldiers and sailors racing to unknown destinations, the knowledge of being abandoned by the garrison filled them with a sense of hopelessness. According to Pereverzev, the government was effectively captive:
I did not arrest the leaders of the uprising on July 4, prior to the publication of documents, only because at that moment they already in effect had under arrest a part of the Provisional Government in Taurida Palace, and could have arrested Prince Lvov, myself, and Kerensky’s deputy without any risk to themselves, if their determination matched even one-tenth their criminal energy.172
