To SACLANT, apart from affording air defence and antisubmarine air patrols for shipping in the Eastern Atlantic and Channel, the UK was a critically important base from which to mount flank support for his Strike Fleet as and when it had to fight its way against Soviet sea and air opposition into the North Norwegian Sea. And in war this was, assuredly what the Strike Fleet would have to do. For SACEUR, the UK would be the mounting base for much of the deeper air effort behind the forward edge of the enemy’s battle area on the Continent. It would also be to the UK that any aircraft and crews held in reserve would be likely to be withdrawn. And then there was the air bridge: the endless belt of heavy-lift jumbo-sized aircraft that would carry most of the human reinforcements and much of their equipment from the USA to Europe as soon as full mobilization’ plans were put into effect. Given a rudimentary air-to-air missile system, even early generation long-range aircraft could wreak havoc with this flow if they got into that great aerial procession. They must not do so — and it was the task of the British Air Defence Commander to see that they did not. If that officer appeared, with the resources available to him in the mid-seventies, a preoccupied man, no one could say he had no cause.
Nevertheless, by 1977 things were beginning to improve, even if, in the view of the Royal Air Force, nothing like quickly enough. Some measurable progress had been made with the addition of two extra air defence squadrons provided by extending the life of some of the
Once the national consciousness began to become uneasy about the danger to the UK of unchecked Soviet military expansion, the path of the air planners became easier, and it was possible to gain some political support from all sides in the House of Commons for measures now clearly seen to be needed for the defence of the homeland. Policy agreement was one thing, putting it into effect was another. The task was formidable. It is no simple matter to increase, or speed up, the production of complex aircraft and weapons, or to create their support facilities. It is more difficult still to conjure up the skilled and experienced men and women needed to operate an expanded and complex military system without mounting a deliberate programme of expansion in sufficient time to develop it in an ordered way over a number of years.
By 1985 the