Yeltsin полностью

76 Konstitutsionnoye soveshchaniye, 20:40, which shows Yeltsin’s stroke of the pen. This was the most important of the fourteen changes Yeltsin made in the draft transmitted to him on November 7. The final clause of Article 90 did specify that his edicts “should not contradict” the constitution and laws.

77 Because Soviet leaders were primarily party heads, protocol was simple and arrangements were handled by the foreign ministry. Gorbachev created a protocol office in his new presidential establishment in 1990. Yeltsin hired the tactful and decent Shevchenko in January 1992 and upgraded the office. For the arrangements on everything from heraldry to the goblets at Kremlin banquets, see V. N. Shevchenko et al., Protokol Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Protocol of the Russian Federation) (Moscow: VAGRIUS, 2000).

78 Gorshkov, Zhuravlëv, and Dobrokhotov, Yel’tsin–Khasbulatov, 543.

79 Quoted in Timothy J. Colton, “Introduction,” in Colton and Hough, Growing Pains, 13. Six cabinet ministers were on the Russia’s Choice list but five, including three deputy premiers, ran for other parties and blocs.

80 Details here from Aleksandr Petrov, “Glavnaya tema: ‘menya vosprinyali kak yel’tsinskogo palacha’” (Main theme: “they took me for Yeltsin’s executioner”), Moskovskiye novosti, September 30, 2003.

81 The line of reasoning Kazannik pursued, and it is a debatable one, is that the government might have negotiated peacefully with the rebels on October 3, in the hours after their initial attack on the Ostankino television tower was repulsed. He knew that the trail of responsibility for “criminal orders,” if that is what they were, led back to Yeltsin as commander-in-chief, but prosecution of a sitting president was an “extremely complex” problem. Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 When Khasbulatov sent Yeltsin a letter in 1996 asking to be allowed to use a Kremlin medical clinic, Yeltsin agreed without hesitation. Yevgenii Kiselëv, “Plyaski na grablyakh” (Dancing on horse rakes), Moskovskiye novosti, September 30, 2003.

84 Kazannik had him released on bail pending trial due to his heart condition. Yeltsin objected (better to let him die in prison, he said) but let it be. After the amnesty, Barannikov asked Yeltsin to let him live in the apartment building in Krylatskoye in which the president’s family was to be registered, and Yeltsin was in favor, until Korzhakov talked him out of it. Petrov, “Glavnaya tema”; Korzhakov, Boris Yel’tsin, 143–44. Barannikov died in July 1995.

85 Ligachëv was elected in 1993. In 1995 he was joined in the communist fraction by Anatolii Luk’yanov. Nikolai Ryzhkov was also elected in 1995 and sat in an affiliated group.

86 See Paul Chaisty and Petra Schleiter, “Productive but Not Valued: The Russian State Duma, 1994–2001,” Europe-Asia Studies 54 (July 2002), 704; and Tiffany A. Troxel, Parliamentary Power in Russia, 1994–2001: President vs. Parliament (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

87 Thomas F. Remington, “Laws, Decrees, and Russian Constitutions: The First Hundred Years” (unpublished paper, Emory University, 2006). This does not count secret decrees, mostly, one assumes, in the national-security realm. The numbers refer only to “normative” decrees with wide consequences, as opposed to “nonnormative” rulings on particular cases. See also Remington, “Democratization, Separation of Powers, and State Capacity,” in Colton and Holmes, State after Communism, 261–98; and Scott Parrish, “Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991–1995,” in John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., Executive Decree Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 62–103.

88 Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From, 168–69.

89 Giuliano, “Secessionism from the Bottom Up,” 286. The significance of Yeltsin’s triumph over his opponents at the center, and the contrast with Gorbachev’s weakness in 1990–91, is well drawn in Roeder, Where Nation-States Come From, chap. 6.

90 This had been Yeltsin’s intent all along, but the plan was upended by his dissolution of provincial legislatures in October 1993, which left half of the proposed representatives to the Federation Council without qualifying office. On the shift to direct election of governors, see Marc Zlotnik, “Russia’s Elected Governors: A Force to Be Reckoned With,” Demokratizatsiya/Democratization 5 (Spring 1997), 184–96.