Yeltsin полностью

In this connection, Yeltsin was in step with parts of his constituency. A critical spirit was afoot in the middle Urals. Sverdlovsk had larger communities of academics, researchers, students, and artists than any city in Soviet Russia except Moscow and Leningrad. Despite Yeltsin’s imperiousness toward Luk’yanin and the censoriousness of the obkom culture department, the authorities purposely overlooked unregistered amateur (samodeyatel’nyye) organizations dedicated to reading poetry and discussing movies. The Sverdlovsk Komsomol committee not only tolerated mass songfests and bohemian clubs for jazz, rock, and film but allocated rooms and equipment to them. Experimental discussion circles were found in several Sverdlovsk universities and institutes. One, in the philosophy department of UPI, was organized by Gennadii Burbulis, who later would be a high-level official in Yeltsin’s Russia. The youth housing complexes were wired for cable television, which was not subject to official censorship. In short, “In Sverdlovsk and Sverdlovsk oblast, changes in the atmosphere of public life began to take place before the advent of perestroika.”⁷⁵ Yeltsin was mindful and did not fight them. He exhorted CPSU and Komsomol organizations to make their activities more relevant to impressionable young people by offering programs that matched their tastes and the values sainted in Soviet propaganda: “When there is a gap between word and deed . . . this has an especially baleful influence on our youth.”⁷⁶

A concrete problem that increasingly distressed was the top-heaviness of Soviet government. In late communist times, decisions responsive to local interests awaited years of special pleading with Moscow. Sverdlovsk planners first petitioned the center to approve a subway in 1963; a preliminary edict was issued in 1970; to get shovels in the ground in 1980, it took entreaties via Andrei Kirilenko and a Yeltsin pilgrimage to Brezhnev’s office, where Brezhnev asked him to handwrite a Politburo resolution; the first stations did not come into service until 1994.⁷⁷ To get things done took pluckiness and ingenuity. The Serov highway was built on the fly over twenty years without any central largesse. Yeltsin badgered factory directors and district personnel for the materials, equipment, and labor. The first secretary, who was god and tsar on some scores, had to be a nagger and a supplicant on others. Through the obkom, he had at his disposal thousands of personnel; thousands more were out of his reach, among them all the holders of top positions in the military-industrial complex. The state industrialists in the factories could not be obliged to contribute, only persuaded. And when they did chip in, Moscow might suddenly reverse direction and take away local gains. In 1980 Yeltsin and Yurii Petrov inveigled twenty Sverdlovsk factories, mostly in the defense sector, to jointly manufacture for use in the oblast heavy-duty harrows, which are toothed steel tools for tilling, aerating, and weeding fields. They were beside themselves when mandarins in Gosplan appropriated the harrows and carted them off to farms in Ukraine, with the statement that Sverdlovsk land was fit only for pasturage. Yeltsin’s telephone calls to Gosplan, the minister of agriculture, and Mikhail Gorbachev, by then the Central Committee’s secretary for agrarian affairs, were in vain.⁷⁸

These machinations brought Yeltsin up against a question pregnant for the future: the place of “Russia” in the Soviet federation. A reason Sverdlovsk fared so badly in the byplay with Moscow was that the regions of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, RSFSR, lacked the mediating structures available to the non-Russian republics. The RSFSR had a toothless government and no CPSU machinery at all. In the party, provinces like Sverdlovsk reported to USSR-level officials; in places like Ukraine and Kazakhstan, there was a republic-level party committee, bureau, and first secretary. An inconsequential Bureau of the Central Committee for RSFSR Affairs had existed in 1936–37, under Stalin, and was resuscitated by Khrushchev in 1958, only to have Brezhnev terminate it in 1965. The Russians “were always the Soviet Union’s awkward nationality, too large either to ignore or to give the same institutional status as the Soviet Union’s other major nationalities.”⁷⁹