Temperley,
Freedom" and showed it to Smuts before he wrote his memorandum was revealed by
Curtis in a private communication to Professor Quincy Wright, according to Q. Wright,
6. W. K. Hancock,
1942), 1, 125.
7. S. G. Millen,
Chapter 10
1. Robert Jemmett Stopford (1895- ) was a banker in London from 1921 to 1928. He
was private secretary to the chairman of the Simon Commission in 1928-193O, a member
of the "Standstill Committee" on German Foreign Debts, a member of the Runciman
Commission to Czechoslovakia in 1938, Liaison Officer for Refugees with the
Czechoslovakian government in 1938-1939, Financial Counselor at the British Embassy
in Washington in 1943-1945.
Chapter 11
1. See
56, and III, 8.
2. According to David Ogg,
"helped Mr. Montagu in drafting the Montagu-Chelmsford Report."
3. This memorandum was published, with Lord Halifax's permission, in A. C.
Johnson,
Chapter 12
1. See the minutes of the Council of Four, as recorded by Sir Maurice Hankey, in U.S.
Department of State,
2. In
1918 as follows: "Europe, 'from the Rhine to the Volga' to quote from a memorandum
written at the time, was in solution. It was not a question now of autocratic against
popular government; it was a question of government against anarchy. From one moment
to the next every responsible student of public affairs, outside the ranks of the
professional revolutionaries, however red his previous affiliations may have been, was
turned perforce into a Conservative. The one urgent question was to get Europe back to
work" (80).
In
"Modern civilization is at grips with two great dangers, the danger of organized
militarism . . . and the more insidious, because more pervasive danger of anarchy and
class conflict.... As militarism breeds anarchy, so anarchy in its turn breeds militarism.
Both are antagonistic to civilization."
In
foreign balance of trade that Germany can alone—apart from any immediately available
assets—pay an indemnity. Why should Germany be able to do the miracle that France
and Italy cannot do, and not only balance her trade, but have great surpluses in addition to
pay over to her enemies? . . . If, as soon as peace is declared, Germany is given assistance
and credit, she can pay us something, and should pay all she can. But what she can pay in
the next five years must be, we repeat, limited. If, on the other hand, we take away from
her all her liquid assets, and all her working capital, if furthermore, she is bound in future
to make yearly payments to an amount which will in any reasonable human expectation
exceed her capacity, then no one outside of a lunatic asylum will lend her money or
credit, and she will not recover sufficiently to pay anything"
(London, 1921), 193.
3. The attitude of the Group toward "French militarism" can be found in many places.
Among others, see Smuts's speech of October 1923, quoted below. This attitude was not
shared by Professor Zimmern, whose understanding of Europe in general and of France
in particular was much more profound than that of other members of the Group. In
the Guarantee Treaty would be the best possible answer to French, and it may be added
also to Belgian fears.... He little knows either the French peasant or the French townsman
who thinks that aggression, whether open or concealed, against Germany need ever be
feared from their country.... France feels that the same willfully uncomprehending British
policy, the same aggravatingly self-righteous professions of rectitude, pursue her in the
East, from Danzig to Upper Silesia, as on the Western frontier of her hereditary foe; and
in her nervous exasperation she puts herself ever more in the wrong with her impeccably