Anglo-American Establishment полностью

Hankey, in Paris and "urged the vital importance of sending Milner as Ambassador,

Minister-Plenipotentiary, call him what you will. Henry Wilson cannot stand alone."

Later the same day he spoke to Lloyd George: "I urged most strongly that he should send

Milner here, on the ground that he would give stability where there is none and that his

presence would ensure Henry Wilson getting 'information.' this I urged specially in view

of the future as of the present. Otherwise we might one day find the Italian position

reproduced in France. He finds Milner almost indispensable, but he will seriously think

of the proposal." Milner was sent to Paris, as Esher wished, four months later. On 2

February 1918, Esher had another conversation, in which Lloyd George spoke of putting

Milner in Derby's place at the War Office. The change was made two months later.

( Journals and Letters of Reginald, Viscount Esher [4 vols., London, 1938], 158-159 and

178.)

3. Zimmern was unquestionably one of the better minds in the Milner Group, and his

ideas were frequently closer to Milner's than those of others of the inner circle. Although

Zimmern agreed with the others in 1919 about the severity of the treaty, his reasons were

quite different and do credit to both his integrity and his intelligence. He objected to the

severity of the treaty because it was a breach of the pre-armistice commitments to the

Germans; at the same time he wanted a continuation of the alliance that had won the war

and a strong League of Nations, because he had no illusions about converting the

Germans to peaceful ways in the near future. The inner circle of the Milner Group were

against a severe treaty or a strong League or an alliance with France because they

believed that Germany could be converted to the British way of thinking and acting and

because they wanted to rebuild Germany as a weapon in a balance-of-power system

against "Russian bolshevism" and "French militarism." Part II of Europe in

Convalescence (New York, 1922) remains to this day the most brilliant summary

available on what went wrong in 1919.

Chapter 9

1. In June 1908, in a speech to the Royal Colonial Institute, Milner said: "Anything

like imperial federation—the effective union of the self-governing states—is not, indeed

as some think, a dream, but is certainly at present little more than an aspiration" (Milner,

The Nation and the Empire [Boston, 1913], 293). In 1891 Sir Charles Tupper said: "Most

people have come to the conclusion stated by Lord Rosebery at the Mansion House, that

a Parliamentary Federation, if practicable, is so remote that during the coming century it

is not likely to make any very great advance." In 1899, Rosebery said: "Imperial

Federation in any form is an impossible dream." See H. D. Hall, The British

Commonwealth of Nations (London, 1920), 70-71. In October 1905, Joseph Chamberlain

said: "You cannot approach closer union by that means." Philip Kerr in 1911 spoke of

federation as "the ill-considered proposals of the Imperial Federation League" ( The

Round Table, August 1911, 1, 374). By this last date, only Lionel Curtis, of the Milner

Group, had much faith in the possibility of federation. This is why his name alone was

affixed, as editor, to the two volumes published by the Group in 1916.

2. On the secret group of 1903-1905, see H. D. Hall, The British Commonwealth of

Nations (London, 1920). The group was clearly made up of members of the Cecil Bloc

and Milner Group. On its report, see the Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute for

1905, appendix; W. B. Worsfold, The Empire on the Anvil (London, 1916); and R. Jebb,

The Imperial Conference (London, 1911), Vol. II. Lyttleton's dispatch is Cond. 2785 of

1905. Kerr's remark is in The Round Table (August 1911), I, 410.

3. This opinion of the important role played by Milner in the period 1916-1921

undoubtedly originated from Geoffrey Dawson, but it was shared by all the members of

the Kindergarten. It is stated in different words by Basil Williams in The Dictionary of

National Biography and by John Buchan in his autobiography, Pilgrim's Way (Boston,

1940).

4. On the reaction to the speeches of Smuts and Halifax, see J. G. Allen, Editorial

Opinion in the Contemporary British Commonwealth and Empire (Boulder, Colorado,

1946).

5. On this whole section, see "George Louis Beer" in The Round Table (September

1920), X, 933-935; G. L. Beer, African Questions at the Peace Conference (New York

1923), 424-425; H. D. Hall, Mandates, Dependencies, and Trusteeship (Washington,

1948); U.S. State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States. Paris Peace