154. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 433–4, 478, 480, 741 n.112, 786 n.155; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 295.
155. Weinberg III, 692–3; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 295–6. On the military details: John Prados, ‘Cobra: Patton’s Offensive in France, Summer 1944’, in Albert A. Nofi (ed.), The War against Hitler. Military Strategy in the West, Conshokoken, PA, 1995, 133–55.
156. In the briefing, Hitler asserted that if he could use another 800 fighters there and then, ‘the entire crisis that we have would be immediately overcome’ (LB Darmstadt, 245). In a subsequent military briefing, on 31 August, Hitler said there would always be moments when the tensions became too great to sustain an alliance. ‘Coalitions in world history have always at some point collapsed. Now we have to wait for the moment, however hard it is’ (LB Darmstadt, 276).
157. Below, 386–7. Hitler eventually gave orders to prepare for a western offensive to take place in November on 19 August, when he told Keitel, Jodl, and Speer to prepare to raise 25 new divisions for the attack. (IfZ, MA 1360, frame 6217521: ‘Notiz Keitels über Besprechung mit General der Artillerie Buhle vom 24. August 1944’, in which Buhle communicated Hitler’s thoughts; Irving, HW, 689 and 889, n. to 689. See also Guderian, 364, where the aim was registered as defeating the western powers and throwing them back into the Atlantic.)
158. LB Darmstadt, 243, 245, 253.
159. LB Darmstadt, 249.
160. LB Darmstadt, 250.
161. LB Darmstadt, 244, 250, 260.
162. Hitler correctly guessed what would have been Montgomery’s preference — a strike into the Ruhr. Eisenhower prevailed in his judgement that the attack on Germany should follow on a broad front along the Rhine. (See LB Darmstadt, 252, n.331; Weinberg III, 697–700.)
163. LB Darmstadt, 251, 253, 258, 262–3.
164. LB Darmstadt, 253, 255.
165. LB Darmstadt, 251, also 258–9, 264.
166. LB Darmstadt, 244.
167. Weinberg III, 721. Dönitz had persuaded Hitler to give priority to building two new U-boat types, Type XXI and the smaller Type XXIII, faster than their predecessors and equipped with schnorkel and radar, allowing them to remain for long periods submerged and to detect enemy aircraft. Shortage of skilled labour and materials, along with disruption caused by bombing, hindered production so that, while the Americans expected 300 new U-boats in service by the end of 1944, only 180 were actually produced by the end of the war. (Parker, Struggle for Survival, 211; see also Thomas, 244–5; Peter Padfield, Dönitz: the Last Führer, New York, 1984, 387 (for Dönitz’s comments to Hitler on 16 December about the need for the new U-boats); and Doenitz, Memoirs, 424ff., 432–3 for his retrospective views on the U-boat campaign in late 1944 and early 1945.)
168. LB Darmstadt, 244–5.
169. LB, Darmstadt, 254–5, 259, 268. The lack of ports for the landing of men and provisions was indeed a hindrance to the Allies during the autumn. Only Cherbourg, much destroyed, was initially in their hands. The surrender of Dieppe and Ostend, and the capture of Brest, Le Havre, Boulogne and Calais made things somewhat easier by October. But the shortage of big dock cranes remained a serious handicap until Antwerp, taken by the British on 4 September, became fully operational, once the Scheldt estuary had been taken, in late November (LB Darmstadt, 253, n.335; Weinberg III, 693). For Hitler’s exchange of telegrams with the commander of the German garrison at St Malo, taken in mid-August, see Domarus, 2142. Hitler told the commander (Colonel von Aulock) that every day he held out was of profit for the German war effort. The commander promised to fight to the last man. Hitler thanked him and his ‘heroic men’, and said the commander’s name would go down in history.
170. Irving, HW, 683–4; Weinberg III, 693; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 202.
171. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 296–7; Weinberg III, 692–4; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 200–2; Irving, HW, 683–9.
