Stalin полностью

198. This would be Lyushkov’s one and only intentional public appearance. He would publish an “open letter to Stalin” in the Japanese periodical Kaizo (April 1939). Kaizo, April 1939: 106–25, excerpted in Lenoe, Kirov Murder, 681–6. For a detailed Japanese report on the July 13 public appearance, see Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, VII/i: 148–51 (TsKhIDK, f. 1, op. 3,4 d. 4601, l. 210–6).

199. Solov’ev and Chugunov, Pogranichnye voiska SSSR, 591–3; “Prikaz narodnogo komissara oborony Soiuza SSR no. 0040 (4 sentiabria 1938).”

200. Petrov and Jansen, Stalinskii pitomets, 161–2. See also Svetlanin, Dal’nevostochnyi zagovor, 124–6.

201. Far Eastern Affairs, 1990, no. 3: 176–84 (Ivan Minka); Merritt, “Great Purges,” 513–5 (citing RGVA, f. 35083, op. 1, d. 3, l. 35, 67; f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1084, l. 37–8; RGASPI, f. 71, op. 25, d. 359, l. 1–2), 526 (citing RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1136, 1. 10; f. 35083, op. 1, d. 28, 11. 113–4).

202. On July 20, 1938, the Japanese ambassador, Mamoru Shigemitsu, paid a call on Litvinov and the two clashed sharply over maps; Litvinov also complained of penetration of Soviet embassy territory in Tokyo by a person who then flung leaflets: Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 369–71 (July 22, 1938).

203. A published Soviet assessment noted Japanese strength in traditional infantry, a low level of mechanization, rendering them unable to mount breakthrough operations, and a domestic Japanese aircraft industry that, despite access to foreign prototypes, was relatively weak by top international standards. The Soviets had a high opinion of Japanese prowess on the sea. Japanese cruisers were state of the art in speed and firepower; they even carried more torpedo tubes than their American counterparts. New Japanese battleships, moreover, were coming off the stocks. Shvede, Voennyi flot Iaponii, 31–2. This assessment would be maintained in the next edition: Voenno-morskoi flot Iaponii (1939).

204. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 252 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 67, l. 28).

205. Coox, Nomonhan, 123–4; Haslam, Threat from the East, 113–4.

206. Coox, Anatomy of a Small War, 57–70; Coox, Nomonhan, 134–5. Sorge would report that “this incident will not lead to a war between the Soviet Union and Japan.” Volkov, “Legendy i deistvitel’nost o Rikharde Zorge,” 100, referring to Toshito Obi, Zoruge jiken, 4 vols. (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1962–71), I: no page number.

207. Grebennik, Khasanskii dnevnik, 54–7.

208. Coox, Anatomy of a Small War.

209. Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, VII/i: 146–7 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 22383, d. 3, l. 185–6).

210. Fesiun, Delo Rikharda Zorge, 87–9

211. Back on July 20, 1936, the then head of Soviet military intelligence (Uritsky) had written to Voroshilov about Sorge concerning a review of intelligence, which had indicated that German-Japanese negotiations for a military alliance were bogged down because of Germany’s desire not to force the issue. Stalin had written on it: “In my view, this is a disorientation emanating from German circles.” Uritsky explained to Voroshilov that the inside knowledge had come primarily from Sorge, who “usually produced good quality information and not infrequently genuine secret documentary material. For example, we have now received from this intelligence operative a report of the German military attaché in Tokyo (sent to you separately). We were able to verify the genuineness of this report, having received analogous documents directly from the German general staff.” On the basis of additional materials, including decoded telegraph traffic between Berlin and Tokyo, Uritsky concluded firmly that Sorge was correct. “In presenting these interpretations and materials to you, I request your instructions about their further forwarding to comrade Stalin.” Voroshilov’s response is unknown. (Uritsky, of course, was later executed as a foreign spy.) Zolotarev, Russkii arkhiv: Velikaia otechestvennaia, VII/i: 141–2 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 3108, d. 3, l. 239–41).

212. Volkogonov, Triumf i tragediia, II/1: 273 (citing TsGASA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1140, l. 18–22); Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy, 327–8; Kortunova, “1938–I,” 175.