Stalin полностью

5. The duce had once told the British ambassador in Rome that Hitler was “a dreamer” and suffered “from an inferiority complex and a bitter sense of injustice.” Robertson, Mussolini as Empire Builder, 57 (citing DBFP, 2nd series, V: 674–5: R. Graham to V. Wellesley, Oct. 11, 1933). Back in July 1934, British foreign secretary Simon wrote to the PM (MacDonald), “We must keep out of trouble in central Europe at all costs . . . There are circumstances in which Italy might move troops into Austria. There are no circumstances in which we would ever dream of doing so.” Aldcroft, “Versailles Legacy.”

6. Mallett, “Fascist Foreign Policy.”

7. Low, Years of Wrath, no pagination.

8. Speer, Spandauer Tagebücher, 199.

9. “That politics is an art there is no doubt,” Mussolini had observed in a speech in 1926 at an art exhibit. “‘Political,’ like artistic, creation is a slow elaboration and a sudden divination. At a certain moment the artist creates with inspiration, the politician with decision.” Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle, 15, citing Mussolini, Scritti e discorsi, V: 279.

10. Dilks makes the further point that the full depravity of Hitler and his regime was neither understood nor evident in 1938. Dilks, “‘We Must Hope for the Best,’” 318, 347.

11. Honig, “Totalitarianism and Realism.”

12. Litvinov, too, rejected a Soviet solo defense of the Versailles order. Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 153–4.

13. By March 18, 1938, Churchill was writing, in an article entitled “The Austrian Eye-Opener,” that “the scales of illusion have fallen from many eyes.” “Friendship with Germany” (Sept. 17, 1937), reprinted in Churchill, Step by Step, 141–4 (at 143–4), 192–5.

14. Weinberg, Hitler’s Foreign Policy, 13.

15. “Three bluffers united are much more powerful than three bluffers playing each for his own hand,” wrote Freda Utley. “Germany, Japan, and Italy stand together, possessing neither the necessary economic strength nor political stability for a real war, yet able to blackmail the democratic powers which possess such strength.” Utley, “Germany and Japan.” Stalin, on Stomonyakov’s recommendation, decided to notify Italy that the Anti-Comintern Pact was not an act of friendship toward the USSR. Sevost’ianov, Moskva-Rim, 436–8 (APRF, f. 3, op. 64, d. 692, l. 78, 80), 438 (l. 37). See also DVP SSSR, XVI: 494–6.

16. Eberhardt, Ethnic Groups and Population Changes, 111–36; Glassheim, Noble Nationalists; Heimann, Czechoslovakia.

17. RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1144, l. 39–41. Prague was sharing intelligence with Moscow; Stalin had his own spy in the Czechoslovak general staff. Khaustov, “Deiatel’nost’ organov,” 277 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 1, d. 210, l. 257; op. 5, d. 63, l. 123; APRF, f. 3, op. 50, d. 32, l. 139).

18. Brook-Shepherd, Anschluss; Gehl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss; von Schuschnigg, Brutal Takeover; Low, Anschluss Movement.

19. Hitler privately judged Halifax “a clever politician who fully supported Germany’s claims.” After Eden resigned in a huff in Feb. 1938, Halifax became foreign secretary. Roberts, Holy Fox, 71 (citing A4 410 33); Eberle and Uhl, Hitler Book, 24–5. On Hitler and Britain, see also von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, 20–32.

20. “His Majesty’s Government,” stated the torturous wording for Henderson to convey to the German government, “could not guarantee that they would not be forced by circumstance to become involved also.” DBFP, 3rd series, I: 331–2 (Halifax to Henderson, May 21, 1938, also referencing a Chamberlain warning in Parliament in March); DDF, 2e série, VIII: 772–4 (March 15); Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 174.

21. Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 565–6.

22. Taylor, Sword and Swastika, 182. See also Waldenegg, “Hitler, Göring, Mussolini.”

23. Price, Year of Reckoning, 91–117; von Schuschnigg, Austrian Requiem, 20–32; Gehl, Austria, Germany, and the Anschluss; Churchill, Second World War, I: 270.

24. Lassner, “Invasion of Austria,” 447–86. See also French Yellow Book, 2–3 (François-Poncet to Paris, March 12, 1938). The French military had its eyes on Spain. “The defeat of Franco would open the door to communism in Spain,” French military intelligence had noted on March 10, 1938. “Will [the communists] be able to retain power? No. But it would take only a few months for such a regime to precipitate a general European war.” Jackson, “French Strategy,” 68 (citing SHAT, 7N 2762–2, “L’influence soviétique en Espagne”).

25. Tooze, Wages of Destruction, 246.