26. Pravda, March 13 and 14, 1938.
27. Bukharin’s doctored final statement appeared in the press (Izvestiia and Pravda, March 13, 1938), and in the 700–page court record, which went to the printer on March 28. Murin, “Kak fal’sifitsirovalos’ ‘delo Bukharina,’” 69: APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 401, l. 03; “‘Moe poslednee slovo na sude, veroiatno, budet moim poslednim solovom voobshche’: kto i kak pravil rech’ N. I. Bukahrina.” From March 1938, whether by coincidence or instruction, the NKVD political mood summaries mentioned “wrecking” less in reports on the actual problems of Soviet defense industry. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 173–6 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 5, d. 42, l. 29–33; d. 40, l. 128, 347; d. 41, l. 51–70; APRF, f. 3, op. 24, d. 338, l. 59). Litvinov finally expressed an official Soviet reaction to the “aggression” at a press conference on March 17, 1938, proposing an international conference, but the Soviets followed with no concrete measures. Izvestiia, March 18, 1938; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 342–4; DVP SSSR, XXI: 138; Dullin, Men of Influence, 253.
28. DVP SSSR, XVIII: 309–12 (pact with France), 333–6 (pact with Czechoslovakia); Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-chekhoslovatskikh otnoshenii, III: 106–7 (Beneš and Alexandrovsky, May 2–3, 1935), 111 (Benešto Czechoslovak missions abroad, May 9), 112 (Litvinov to Alexandrovsky, May 11). Hochman argues that the condition of Soviet obligations (obliged to act only if France did so) had been insisted upon by Moscow. Hochman, Failure of Collective Security, 52–3. Cf. Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, 51.
29. DVP SSSR, XXI: 125–6 (Potyomkin, March 15, 1938).
30. DVP SSSR, XXI: 142–7 (Alexandrovsky with Krofta, March 21); Spáčil and Mal’tsev, Dokumenty po istorii miunhkenskogo sgovora, 49–52 (Shaprov, March 15); Dokumenty po istorii sovetsko-chekhoslovatskikh otnoshenii, III: 382 (Fierlinger from Moscow, March 15).
31. Sluch, “Pol’sha v politike Sovetskogo Soiuza,” 160 (citing AVPRF, f. 0138, op. 19, pap. 128, d. 1, l. 19); Na prieme, 233.
32. RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1144, l. 86–7 (Kashuba from Prague, April 9, 1938), Volkogonov papers, Hoover, container 16.
33. Pravda, March 29, 1938.
34. Young, “French Intelligence,” 274, 278: April 6, 1938.
35. Na prieme, 235–6; Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-chekhoslovatskikh otnoshenii, III: 402 (Fierlinger to Krofta, April 23, 1938). “We come to the aid of Czechoslovakia in the event France comes to its aid and, conversely, Czechoslovakia comes to our aid in the event that France comes to our aid,” Kalinin explained to a gathering of propagandists on April 26. He added that the Soviet-Czechoslovak pact “does not prohibit either party rendering assistance to the other without waiting for France”—a statement not reproduced in the press account. Zemskov, Novye dokumenty iz istorii Miunkhena, 27–8; Dokumenty i materialy po istorii sovetsko-chekhoslovatskikh otnoshenii, III: 402–3 (April 26). On May 8, Kalinin informed a visiting Czechoslovak delegation that the Soviet Union would honor its treaty obligations “to the last letter.” Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Hitler and Stalin, 143.
36. Bandinelli, Hitler e Mussolini; Baxa, “Capturing the Fascist Moment”; Corvaja, Hitler and Mussolini, 59–74.
37. DVP SSSR, XXI: 276 (Alexandrovsky, May 18, 1938).
38. Henke, England in Hitlers politischem Kalkül, 150–62. Sir Horace Wilson, at a luncheon on May 10, 1938, told Soviet ambassador Maisky that “Germany’s expansionary ambitions to create a Mitteleuropa would undermine it by its conglomerate of nationalities, state organizations, and economic regions, producing internal frictions and struggles.” Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 114.
39. Lukes, “Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization.” František Moravec, then head of Czechoslovak military intelligence, later insisted that the German attack plans (intercepted and decoded) were real, and that the Czechoslovaks had no choice except to mobilize in response. Moravec, Master of Spies, 110–1.
