Stalin полностью

173. On Nov. 10, 1938, Hitler told four hundred invited German journalists: “It was only out of necessity that for years I talked of peace. But it was now necessary gradually to re-educate the German people psychologically and make it clear that there are things which must be achieved by force.” Noakes and Pridham, Nazism, III: 721–4.

174. Britain lost its Czechoslovakia intelligence station. Earlier, the Austrian station chief for British intelligence had been arrested in 1938 when the Nazis marched in. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 57.

175. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 29–33 (RGVA, f. 33987, op. 3, d. 1237, l. 162ss–167ss.).

176. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 204–5; Salter, Personality in Politics, 85.

177. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/i: 9–12.

178. DGFP, series D, VI: 91–6; DVP SSSR, XXII/ii: 537–8n86. A Romanian-German timber agreement followed on May 13, 1939.

179. Khaustov and Samuelson, Stalin, NKVD, 286 (TsA FSB, f. 3, op. 4, d. 105, l. 96–107).

180. DGFP, series D, VI: 121–4; Trial of the Major War Criminals, IV: 404 (Brauchitsch), III: 217. In March 1939, Lieutenant Colonel Stefan Mossor of the general inspectorate of the Polish armed forces wrote a memorandum urging the general staff “to prepare for Soviet air bases in the region of Brest and anticipate the march of Soviet forces primarily through northern Poland to attack East Prussia.” He was removed from his position.

181. DVP SSSR, XXII/i: 230 (AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 2, d. 11, l. 172), 231 (pap. 20, d. 228, l. 1–2), 232 (pap. 1, d. 5, l. 117–8), 233 (l. 121).

182. Andrew, Defense of the Realm, 205.

183. French Yellow Book, 104 (George Bonnet to Léon Noel, French ambassador to Warsaw, March 31, 1939).

184. Gromyko et al., SSSR v bor’be za mir nakanune, 290–1 (Maisky, 31, 1939); Falin, Soviet Peace Efforts, I: 300.

185. Gibbs, Grand Strategy, I: xxi–xxii, 689ff.

186. Interview in London, March 18, 1939: Fourth International (New York) 3/1 (1942): 117. Confronting Hitler would indeed cost the empire.

187. “As Prime Minister,” explained Strang, an adviser, “Chamberlain took increasingly into his own hands the conduct of foreign policy, or rather of that branch of foreign policy which might involve issues of peace or war, namely relations with the two European dictatorships”—meaning Germany and Italy. Strang, Home and Abroad, 124.

188. Aster, 1939, 14–16, 359–60. See also Bond, British Military Policy, 306; and Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement, 214.

189. Chamberlain had assured the Cabinet that “it would, of course, be for us to determine what action threatened Polish independence. This would prevent us from becoming embroiled as the result of a frontier incident.” Newman, March 1939, 202 (citing CAB/98: Cabinet Minutes, March 31, 1939).

190. Strang, “Once More unto the Breach”; Newman, March 1939.

191. “It was in Spain that men learnt that one can be right and still be beaten, that force can vanquish spirit, and that there are times when courage is not its own reward,” Albert Camus would write. “It is this which explains why so many men throughout the world regard the Spanish drama as a personal tragedy.” Camus, “préface,” in Georges Bataille (ed.), L’Espagne libre.

192. Parker, Churchill and Appeasement, 156.

193. Thompson, Anti-Appeasers.

194. The gold was on deposit with the Bank for International Settlements, founded in 1930 in Switzerland, which used the Bank of England; still, the latter honored the request for transfer of the reserves. Blaazer, “Finance and the End of Appeasement.”

195. Watt, How War Came, 162–87; Cienciala, “Poland in British and French Policy,” reprinted in Finney, Origins of the Second World War, 413–33. On long-standing British sympathy for Germany’s claims to Danzig and the Corridor, see Cienciala, “German Propaganda.”

196. Steiner, Triumph of the Dark, 737–8.

197. Because Hitler could not attack the Soviet Union without bringing Poland into play, the French ambassador to the Soviet Union believed that, in effect, the “guarantee” to Poland brought about, indirectly, what Chamberlain had said he would never do: put Britain on the line to defend the USSR. Coulondre, De Staline à Hitler, 263.

198. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 170.

199. DBFP, 3rd series, V: 104.

200. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 4–5.