157. Maisky had written from London to Litvinov (Feb. 10, 1939) to the effect that war between the Axis and the “so-called” Western democracies was not imminent, though “one could not completely exclude such a possibility, especially in 1939,” because “matters depended on Hitler and Mussolini.” Maisky also wrote that Hitler “is little inclined to go full bore against Poland, let alone the USSR.” AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 3, d. 35, l. 51–3 (Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 1). Five days after the March 15 occupation of Czechoslovakia, Litvinov wrote to Stalin, latching on to Chamberlain’s dispatch to Moscow of a trade negotiator, Robert Hudson, but the Soviets put the onus on the British. “Since our many previous proposals have failed to yield results,” Litvinov wrote to Hudson, “we do not now intend to advance any new proposals and are awaiting an initiative from those who must in some way indicate that they are ready to take measures to enter collective security.”
158. Watt,
159. Nowak, “Von der Karpatenukraine zum Karpatenland”; Winch,
161. A. Gerasimov, “O zakhvate Chechoslovakii Germaniei,” RGVA, f. 33 987, op. 3, d. 1237, l. 162–7. Litvinov had written to Maisky that the Western democracies were in essence saying to Hitler, “Go east, or we will unite with them [the Soviets] against you. I would not be surprised if Hitler undertakes the same gestures towards us.” AVP RF, f. 06, op. 1, pap. 4, d. 34, l. 39–41 (Volkogonov papers, Hoover Institution Archives, container 1).
162. Volkogonov,
163. On the eve of the Munich Pact, Trotsky had dismissed Stalin’s policy of “collective security” against Nazi Germany as a “lifeless fiction” and predicted that “we may now expect with certainty Soviet diplomacy to attempt a rapprochement with Hitler.” On the eve of Czechoslovakia’s destruction, Trotsky wickedly observed that Hitler went from triumph to triumph, whereas “Stalin met only defeat and humiliation (China, Czechoslovakia, Spain).” Trotsky,
164. A plan would be presented to him in July 1939 and be approved in Aug. Soviet intelligence’s documents on the Trotsky assassination efforts are said to be largely missing, except for the period Aug. 1940 to the end of 1941. Primakov,
165. One of the abandoned field agents, code-named Felipe, would manage to get back to Moscow in Jan. 1940 and report details on Trotsky’s security system and the comings and goings from his villa in Mexico, all of which he had undertaken to ascertain on his own; he would be sent back to Mexico to be part of the operations. Primakov,
166. Eitingon had helped direct sabotage of rail lines and airfields, as a deputy to Orlov. Sudoplatov,
167. “This is not just an act of revenge, although Konovalets is an agent of German fascism,” Stalin had supposedly explained to Sudoplatov. “Our goal is to behead the movement of Ukrainian fascism on the eve of war and force these gangsters to annihilate each other in a struggle for power.” Sudoplatov,
168. Sudoplatov,
169. Sudoplatov,
170. Eitingon was denounced by Peterss and Karakhan. Sharapov,
171. Schroeder, “Alliances 1815–1945,” 195–222. More broadly, see Posen,
172. Posen,