302. Timoshenko and Zhukov reported that in the first quarter of 1941, there had been 156 crashes killing 141 crew and destroying 138 aircraft. Volkogonov, Stalin: Triumph, 375 (citing TsAMO, f. 75284, op. 1, d. 119, l. 18). From Sept. 1, 1939, through June 22, 1941, the Luftwaffe, in training at flight schools, lost 1,924 killed and another 1,439 injured. Additionally, units in combat in the same period, in accidents and disasters, lost 1,609 killed and 485 injured. On average, this was 248 people a month. Solonin, “Delo aviatorov.”
303. Suvenirov, Tragediia RKKA, 135, 381. Kulik had sidetracked the Soviets’ own superior F-34 tank gun, whose production had been initiated by others, and even got Stalin to cut production of the versatile 76-mm antitank gun. “Disorganized but with a high opinion of himself, Kulik thought all his actions infallible,” recalled his first deputy. “Holding his subordinates in a state of fear was what he considered to be the best way of working.” Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi, 163. See also Pospelov, Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny, I: 414–6, 475–6; Zakharov, Nakanune velikikh ispytanii, reprinted in idem., General’nyi shtab, 391; “Nakanune voiny: iz postanovlenii vysshikh partiinykh i gosudarstvennykh organov (Mai 1940 g.—21 iiunia 1941 g.),” 201–3; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367; Vannikov, “Iz zapisok narkoma vooruzheniia”; Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 62–3. When Khrushchev overstepped his writ and questioned Kulik’s competence, Stalin exploded: “You don’t even know Kulik! I know him from the civil war when he commanded the artillery in Tsaritsyn. He knows artillery!” Khrushchev, Vospominaniia, I: 283–4.
304. Kuznetsov and Dhzoga, Pervye geroi Sovetskogo Soiuza, 54. Rychagov was succeeded by his deputy, the forty-one-year-old Pavel Zhigaryov. Rychagov had proven his mettle in Spain in 1936 and at Lake Khasan in 1938. During the Finnish War, his forces, the 8th Army, had been surrounded and practically annihilated. See also “Beseda s admiralom flota Sovetskogo Soiuza I. S. Isakovym [May 21, 1962],” in Simonov, Glazami cheloveka moego pokoleniiia, 372–9.
305. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 671–2 (TsAMO, f. 23, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 120–1). The Germans were issuing knowingly false military radio reports, overheard by Soviet signals intelligence agents, about the movement of their troops into Romania and Hungary, as if they were preparing to strike Ukraine. Mel’tiukhov, Upushchennyi shans Stalina, 252, 296–7. See also Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 174, 178–82, 225–6.
306. The envoy was Anatoly Lavrentyev (b. 1904), who until 1939 had worked in the heavy industry commissariat. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe” (no. 2), 75: PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 (R 29716), Bl. 081 (113485); Vishlev, Nakanune, 50. The Slovak envoy in Moscow, according to the Germans, surmised that Stalin would satisfy German demands for whatever goods its war economy needed, but would not consent to placing Soviet territories under German rule. Nekrich, Pariahs, 229 (citing Bundesarchiw-Militärarchiw. RMII/34: 238: German naval attaché to Berlin, May 21, 1941).
307. An NKGB agent traveled the border on the German side, finding it saturated with troops in full combat gear hiding in the forests, with special weapons depots and oil tanks stuffed, and bridges fortified and heavily guarded. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 276–7 (citing TsA SVR, d. 21616, t. 2, l. 372–5: Kobulov to Timoshenko, June 9, 1941).
308. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 148–50 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1841–5: June 9, 1941). See also Bezymenskii, Gitler i Stalin, 474.
309. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 212 (TsA FSK: June 9, 1941). A note with the published document states that “the Japanese shared intelligence about the USSR with the Swedish, Turkish, Bulgarian and other embassies.”
310. Kumanev, “‘22ogo’ na rassvete,” 3 (citing Timoshenko recollections, at the Institute of History, Feb. 19, 1967); Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296–7; Whymant, Stalin’s Spy, 184 (no citation). Timoshenko’s recollections came after the Moscow showing of the film about Sorge. The Kremlin meeting could have happened on June 6, 1941. Vatutin evidently was also present. Gordetsky gives the date as June 18.
311. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1846: June 11, 1941); “Sovetskie organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny.” See also Hilger and Mayer, Incompatible Allies, 334–6.
