312. Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 219–20 (TsA FSK); Primakov, Ocherki, III: 486 (TsA FSB, f. 3 os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1853–55); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 216. The NKGB First Directorate summary of Kobulov’s report for the leadership altered the paragraph structure slightly, emphasizing the sentence: “Whether there will initially be some kind of demands presented to the Soviet Union is unknown.” Naumov, 1941 god, II: 342–3. Kobulov stressed that the recommendation of “Elder” to preempt the Germans was “straight from the heart,” not a “provocation.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 296 (citing TsA SVR, d. 23078, t. 1, l. 430–1). On June 9, 1941, border intelligence reported that as of May 28 the concentration of all troops against the USSR, including on the territory of the former Austria, the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, Greece, Romania, and Germany east of Berlin, reached approximately 4.5 million. “Furthermore, Major Wendel [the source at German HQ] said that this army is fully ready for war with the USSR.” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 676–80 (TsAMO, f. 127, op. 12915, d. 16, l. 362–8).
313. Moritz, Fall Barbarossa, 192. All the German war updates for the USSR can be found in Whaley, Codeword, 251–6. Hitler had returned from the Berghof to Munich on June 11, 1941, and late the next day left for Berlin, arriving by train near noon on June 13. The next day, he delivered a final all-day briefing to his forty-five most senior commanders at the Reich chancellery. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 605–6; Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455 (June 14, 1941), 456 (June 14). On June 17 Hitler and then the High Command confirmed the timetable. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, VI: 1001; Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie, 508.
314. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 151–3 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1857–50). See also Sinitsyn, Rezident svidetel’stvuet, 117–8 (referring to the agent “Monk,” who does not appear in the published intelligence materials); and Beshanov, Leningradskaia oborona, 28. The Soviet London station had reported on how Finland would join a German invasion of the USSR. TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 57, l. 1178–9 (May 4), l. 1220–1 (May 7), l. 1373–4 (May 16); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 177 (TsA SVR, f. 23078, t. 1, l. 366: May 7). The NKGB reported a partial Finnish mobilization on June 13. Vinogradov et al., Sekrety Gitlera, 156–7 (TsA FSB, f. 3os, op. 8, d. 58, l. 1861–2).
315. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 309.
316. Beria added that from Oct. 1940 through June 10, the NKVD recorded 185 planes violating Soviet air space. He further reported that from Jan. 1 through June 10, more than 2,000 border violators from the German side had been detained. Many had grenades and portable radio stations. There were worries of biological warfare terror (vials with epidemic-inducing diseases). Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 220–1 (TsA FSK: June 12, 1941), 228 (TsA FSK).
317. On June 13, Dekanozov telegrammed Molotov about Soviet agents having observed a massive transport of troops and equipment toward the Soviet frontier: heavy artillery, tanks, trucks, planes. “Kanun voiny: preduprezhdeniia diplomatov,” 76. On June 14, Dekanozov added that the Swedish and Danish military attachés in Berlin no longer believed troop concentrations constituted a tactic to force concessions but instead amounted to “genuine preparation for a war against the Soviet Union.” Sipols, Tainy, 398–9. Dekanozov had met “Elder” and “Corsican” and was evidently persuaded by them that this was war, not an ultimatum. Sokolov, “Novye dannye.”
318. Vishlev, Nakanune, 163 (PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop. Vertrauliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462591–462594); Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 94–5. Hitler did not trust Berlings, and on June 18 ordered “close surveillance” on him and, after the onset of hostilities, his arrest. In fact, he would be sent to Sweden. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 74 (citing ADAP, XII/ii: doc. 639, 645). The Russian press frequently cites a report by Yankel “Jan” Chernyak (“Jean”) on June 12 that the attack would commence on June 22 at 3:30 a.m. This warning, if it occurred, has not been published in the various collections of intelligence documents.
319. “These rumors,” the bulletin stated, “are the clumsy product of the propaganda of forces inimical to the USSR and Germany, forces interested in the extension of the war.” Also, the Soviet embassay on June 10 had reported word that Simon had begun secret negotiations with Hess on June 10. Rozanov, Stalin-Gitler, 203–4.
