320. Izvestiia, June 14, 1941; Tisminets, Vneshniaia politika SSSR, IV: 555–6. See also Werth, Russia at War, 125–6; Gafencu, Prelude to the Russian Campaign, 207–8. “The affairs of the TASS communique was a last resort,” recalled Molotov late in life. “If we had been successful in delaying the war beyond the summer it would have been very difficult to start it in the autumn. So far, diplomacy had been very successful in delaying war, but no one could predict when it would fail.” Chuev, Sto sorok, 42–3.
321. Andreas-Friedrich, Berlin Underground, 67–8. Other rumors, however, indicated an impending attack that very month. Boberach, Meldungen aus dem Reich, VII: 3374, 2380, 2394.
322. Herwarth, Against Two Evils, 195.
323. Sontag and Biddie, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 345–46.
324. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 78 (citing PA AA Bonn: Dienstelle Ribbentrop, Vertaruliche Berichte über Russland [Peter], 2/3 [R 27113], Bl. 462597).
325. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, II: 455–6 (June 14); Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 147.
326. Vishlev, “Pochemu zhe,” 76 (citing PA AA Bonn: Büro des Staatssekretär, Russland, Bd. 5 [R 29716], Bl. 051–054 [113455–113457], 066 [113470], 104–6 [113508–114510], 130–31 [113534–113535]; Jacobsen, Kreigestagebuch, I: 404.
327. Zhukov offers a colorful treatment of the call. Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 383; Zhukov, Vospominaniia, I: 367. For restrictions on measures to improve military readiness, see also Anfilov, Krushenie pokhoda Gitlera, 98ff. Some Soviet commanders viewed the TASS communique as an indication that on high, somehow, they were averting war, despite the colossal buildup. But the general staff was told the TASS bulletin bore no relation to ongoing Soviet military preparations. Ivanov, Shtab armeiskii, 40; Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 108.
328. Vasilevskii, Delo vsei zhizni, 43. The western military districts were also ordered to field headquarters. Mobilized units from Eastern Siberia and Mongolia, ordered west on May 22, were due to arrive in Ukraine (Berdichev, Proskurov, Shepetovka) between June 17 and July 10.
329. Fröhlich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 376–81; Taylor, Goebbels Diaries, 414–6. See also Vishlev, Nakanune, 26–9, 151. Concerning Hitler’s “silence” after the TASS bulletin, Gafencu, the Romanian envoy, telegrammed Bucharest (June 16) that “the war of nerves is at full blast, worsened by the news from Finland and Romania about more and more significant military preparations.” Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 307. Köstring wrote to Berlin (June 18) that “gossip and rumors here have reached unfathomable magnitude. To transmit them would take whole volumes.” Teske, General Ernst Köstring, 320.
330. Golikov’s warnings were more balanced than many critics have asserted. Naumov, 1941 god, II: 87–9 (April 16, 1941), II: 119–20 (April 25, 1941), II: 213–5 (May 15, 1941), II: 324–5 (June 5, 1941), II: 333 (June 7, 1941); “Nakanune voiny (1940–1941 gg.),” 219–20; Iampol’skii et al., Organy, I/ii: 136–7 (May 5, 1941). But Golikov clashed over assessments of German troop concentrations with Novobranets, acting head of the information (analytical) bureau of military intelligence. Golikov was said to have used a derogatory name for the Ukrainian Novobranets (khokhol). Novobranets quotes a document from Beria, supposedly prepared on June 21, 1941: “Lt.-General F. I. Golikov, the head of military intelligence (where the Berzin band recently reigned), complains about his Colonel Novobranets, who also lies, claiming that Hitler has concentrated 170 divisions against us on our western border. But I and my people, Iosif Vissarionovich, firmly remember your wise forecast: Hitler will not attack us in 1941!” Novobranets, “Nakanune voiny,” 176–8, 165; Krasnaia zvezda, Feb. 2 1991; Naumov, 1941 god, II: 46–7 (TsAMO, op. 7237, d. 2, l. 84–6: April 4, 1941).
331. Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, 88–9; Coox, “Japanese Foreknowledge,” 225; McNeal, Stalin, 237.
332. On May 20 Churchill told General Sikorski that a German attack on the USSR “does not seem to enter into consideration.” On May 23, a British Joint Intelligence Committee report, which the Soviets obtained, noted: “With her usual thoroughness Germany is making all preparations for an attack so as to make the threat convincing.” Antonov, “Anatolii Gorskii.”
