333. On June 13, the British Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that Stalin would make the concessions necessary to escape war. That day, Eden summoned Maisky, telling him to come alone; Maisky had no choice but to bring his minder, Novikov, which irritated Eden. The British foreign secretary explained the intensity of the German buildup, indicating the information came from extremely reliable sources, and pledged British assistance if the USSR were attacked. Gorodetsky, Maisky Diaries, 361; Haslam, Near and Distant Neighbors, 115 (citing JIC [41] 251 [Final]: FO 371/29484). By June 10, Enigma intercepts made clear that attack would not commence until after June 15. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence, I: 472 (citing FO 371/29481, N 2498/78/38), 474 (citing CX/JQ/S11), 477, 479; Woodward, British Foreign Policy, 617, 619–20.
334. Barros and Gregor, Double Deception, 194–6 (citing PRO, PREM3/230/1).
335. Gorchakov, “Nakanune, ili tragediia Kassandry,” 21.
336. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 282–3, 305. Churchill wrote to his counterpart Smuts in South Africa (June 18), “According to all the information I have, Hitler is going to take what he wants from Russia, and the only question is whether Stalin will attempt a vain resistance.”
337. DGFP, series D, XII: 1030; Frölich, Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels, IX: 373–76; Vishlev, Nakanune, 58; Hilger and Meyer, Incompatible Allies, 328, 330, 334; Fel’shtinskii, Oglasheniiu podlezhit, 359.
338. Sorge added: “I saw a message to Germany that in the event a war arises between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan will demand around six weeks before beginning an attack on the Soviet Far East, but the Germans think the Japanese will need more time, because that will be a war on land and sea . . .” Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 692 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 24127, d. 2, l. 454); Naumov, 1941 god, II: 380; Fesiun, Delo Rikhard Zorge, 120–1; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, 161 (photocopy of the original telegram). In a second message transmitted on June 17, Sorge clarified that his earlier message was indeed about nine full armies (150 divisions), not nine army corps. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 692 (TsAMO f. 23, op. 5840, d. 7, l. 88).
339. Lota, “Alta” protiv “Barbarossy,” 349; Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 691. Military intelligence reported on June 15, that as of June 1 Germany had 286 to 296 total divisions, and had concentrated 120 to 122 of them on the Soviet frontier with Germany and Romania, and that this movement continued. Gavrilov, Voennaia razvedka informiruet, 686–90 (June 15, 1941).
340. On June 16, “Corsican” informed Korotkov (“Stepanov”) about Rosenberg’s speech. Peshcherskii, “Krasnaia kapella,” 145.
341. Sinitsyn, Rezident svidetel’stvuet, 132–3; “Vospominaniia nachal’nika razvedki P.M. Fitina,” 18, 20–1; Sharapov, “Za sto chasov do voiny”; Lota, Sekretnyi front, 35–6; Chudodeev, “Chelovek iz ‘gruppy Ya,’” 18–24. See also Sudoplatov, Special Tasks, 122–3. Fitin does not appear in Stalin’s office logbook; neither does the GB personnel Sinitsyn, Sudoplatov, or Rybkin-Yartsev. Bondarenko, Fitin, 222–3. On June 17 Merkulov and his two deputies, Bogdan Kobulov and Mikhail Gribov, were summoned to Stalin’s office (Molotov was also present) for some forty minutes (8:20–9:00 p.m.). Kobulov was back on June 18 for five minutes, in the company of Molotov, Timoshenko, Zhukov, and Malenkov. Na prieme, 336–7.
