Yeltsin полностью

Yeltsin admitted that he might be inciting unrealistic hopes. He had received, he said in December 1982, a squall of letters from Sverdlovskers begging him to advance them in the waiting line for government-built apartments. This was impossible, since the function had to be done by the book. He would check the correspondence and right any wrongs done. Other than that, he counseled honesty about the problem and forbearance until the housing supply could be increased: “I am not a magician. Neither are the central organs of government magicians. . . . It is hard to take when your request is refused, but I believe that the bitter truth is better than the sweet lie.”⁹⁶ That aphorism was to take Yeltsin a long way.

Still captive to the communist paradigm, Yeltsin was declaring that the performance of the regime left something to be desired and he was simultaneously putting himself forward as the agent of change. This was the jumping-off point for role aggrandizement in the future.

Not everyone was taken by an approach that threw other local leaders into shadow. Gennadii Bogomyakov, the CPSU first secretary in Tyumen, the adjacent, oil-rich oblast in west Siberia, carped to party officials that Yeltsin was pandering and acting like a clown, not a proper Soviet solon.⁹⁷ Ryabov was to write in hindsight that Yeltsin had begun “to play a phony game,” although he had to concede that his antics hoodwinked “simple people.” “‘Look what sort of leader we have,’ they said.”⁹⁸ No alarm bells jangled where it counted—in the inner sanctum of the party in Moscow. Pavel Simonov in the Central Committee apparatus had admonished Yeltsin soon after his appointment to keep his photograph off the front page of Ural’skii rabochii.⁹⁹ No one seemed unhappy with his playing to the crowd or at seeing his face splashed on the television screen hour after hour. Either official awareness was lagging or, more likely, there was an opinion at the center that the party would be better off if all local leaders were as popular as its man in Sverdlovsk.

Boris Yeltsin’s flight to prominence in a communist framework was by dint of his intelligence, drive, ability to communicate and call attention to himself, and “iron grip.” And it owed much to an instinct for timely decisions. The portrait in Confession of his log hopping on the Zyryanka River as a teenager may serve as an allegory for how he made his way in an uncharitable environment. “If you figured everything just right” and had “incredible dexterity,” he says, “you had a chance to cross over to the far bank.” Leap soon or late, or misconstrue another boy’s motion, and you would plop into the water, gasping for air, and have to clamber onto a new log to resume your quest, “not sure if you would save yourself.”¹⁰⁰ In the work world, Yeltsin chose well when to spring and when to stand pat. If not—if, say, he had been unadventurous about trying out party work or had committed political hara-kiri by disobeying the Politburo on Ipat’ev House—he would occupy history’s footnotes and not its central narrative. Minus Yeltsin as a driving force, the narrative itself would be considerably different.

There were times when the self-interested actions of others, like Ryabov in pushing him for first secretary, propelled Yeltsin forward. Still other times, it was dumb luck and contingency. He might have come to a different end if Eduard Shevardnadze had not lured away Gennadii Kolbin in 1975, if Vyacheslav Bayev had taken the second secretaryship, if Moscow had listened to Leonid Ponomarëv in 1976, or if Dmitrii Ustinov or someone else had settled scores for his toying with General Ageyev, his witticisms with the workers, or his affiliation with the fallen Ryabov. If his patrons had known ex ante what they were to know ex post, it would have ended poorly for him. Ryabov, for one, believes the Yeltsin of the 1990s to be a turncoat, and says it all started in Sverdlovsk. These are the pangs of a Victor Frankenstein beholding his monster. Ryabov is not the only old-school communist who feels them today.