The sachem of Sverdlovsk no longer needed to be a survivalist; his testing was routinized; his rebellious urges were in abeyance. The primary script in his mature life was success—being first—constrained by duty to the vertical structures hegemonic in Soviet society. Although the regime was dictatorial, agents could implement its will only if they could recruit and promote on merit and if they were given some leeway and some space to advocate for themselves and their organizations. Yeltsin was an effective regional prefect, a hard-boiled boss with a difference, because he used to his advantage the liberties granted. Doing so made him less convinced than when he started of the soundness and perfectability of the system. Serious policy questions could only be settled in a “supercentralized” fashion, he was to recall. But the center’s attention span was short and its strategic sense vitiated by aged leaders and the opaqueness of decision making. Get away from its priorities, and the problems were yours to handle: “All you could place your trust in was yourself and the oblast. . . . The center did little to help. . . . We decided the other questions by ourselves, self-reliantly
CHAPTER FIVE
Megalopolis
Boris Yeltsin was not going to count in the main game of Soviet politics unless he relocated from the fringes of the system to the metropole. Did he want to? He denies it in his memoirs: “I never had the dream or so much as the wish to work in Moscow.” He had received a series of proposals to resettle there, “some of them” as minister in the central government, and turned them all down. A son of Sverdlovsk and the Urals, he wanted to stay with his friends and colleagues and loathed how Muscovites created prettified façades, Potemkin villages, and looked down their noses at country cousins.1 His Sverdlovsk patron, Yakov Ryabov, spins it differently. Sverdlovskers frequently moved to Moscow and to other regions, and thought it “a normal part of the selection and assignment of cadres.” Yeltsin studied with interest several offers in the provinces and the capital before he was lifted to obkom secretary in 1975, and used them to importune Ryabov to advance his career locally.2 He also, Ryabov claims, felt envious of some of the promotions given to others—for example, Nikolai Ryzhkov, the director of Uralmash, who moved to a high ministerial position in 1975.3 Information is lacking on the jobs Yeltsin may have turned down after 1975. If he did so, it was not out of a refusal to leave Sverdlovsk.
As a reputable regional administrator, Yeltsin was a surefire candidate for inclusion in any effort to revivify the Soviet leadership. Generational kinetics bolstered the case for him. In November 1976 only three of seventy-two first secretaries in RSFSR regions were younger than he, and he was ten years younger than the average fifty-five-year-old provincial leader. By January 1985 he was at the median in seniority—thirty-six officials had been chosen earlier than he and thirty-five later—but
Yeltsin’s rise out of Sverdlovsk came in three steps in 1985. All were questioned by Muscovites with political clout. Personalities and niggling jealousies, not grand visions of reform, were behind it. There were to be consequences, however.
The change to change in the USSR started in the abbreviated Kremlin reign of Yurii Andropov, the onetime KGB chairman who succeeded Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 and died of kidney failure in February 1984. Andropov sounded the alarm about the regime’s problems and tried to inculcate “order and discipline” in the bureaucracy and the workforce. His disciplinarian line was in those days very much to the liking of Yeltsin, who was to voice “the highest and the best opinion” of him.5 One may conjecture also that Yeltsin’s grizzled supporter in the Politburo, Andrei Kirilenko, expounded his qualities to Andropov before Kirilenko’s retirement in late 1982.
