17 This typically ‘philosophical' effect is predisposed to being reproduced indefinitely, in all the encounters between ‘philosophers’ and ‘laymen', and particularly the specialists in positive disciplines who are inclined to recognize the social hierarchy of legitimacies which confers on the philosopher the position of last appeal, which is both crowning and ‘founding* at the same time This professorial 'coup' is obviously best employed in ‘professional* usage: the philosophical text, the product of a process of esoterization, will be made exoteric at the cost of a process of commentary which its esoteric nature makes indispensable and whose best effects lie in the (artificial) concretizations which lead, in a process neatly reversing that of the (artificial) break, to (he re* activation of the primary sense, initially euphemized to render them esoteric, but with a full accompaniment of cautions (This is only an example') aimed at preserving the ritual distance.
18 Heidegger. Being and Time, p, 158,
19 J. Lacan, Merits, tr, A Sheridan (London: Tavistock. 1977), p. 173.
20 Heidegger, Being and Time, p, 165. Since the Heideggerian ’philosophical’ style is the sum of a small number of effects that are repeated indefinitely, it was preferable to grasp them in the context of a single passage - the analysis of assistance - in which they are all concentrated and which should be re-read in one go in order to see how these effects are articulated in practice in a particular discourse.
21 Thus the innumerable binary oppositions imagined by anthropologists and sociologists to justify the de facto distinction that exists between the societies assigned to anthropology and the societies assigned to sociology - ‘community7‘society\ *folk7‘urban\ ‘Traditional7‘modcrn\ ‘warm societiesV'cold societies', etc, - constitute a prime example of the series of parallel oppositions which is by definition interminable, since each particular opposition seizes on part of the fundamental opposition, essentially multi-faceted and pluri-vocal, between classless societies and societies divided into classes, which it expresses in a way that is compatible with (he properties and conventions which vary from one field to the next, and also from one state to another within the same field, i.e. more or less ad infinitum,
22 It is obvious that language offers other possibilities for ideological games than those exploited by Heidegger. Thus the dominant political jargon exploits principally the potential ambiguity and misunderstanding implied by the multiplicity of class usages or specialized usages (linked to specialist fields).
23 One could counter these analyses by arguing that to a certain extent they only elucidate those properties of the Heideggerian use of language that Heidegger himself expressly claims - at least in his most
recent writings. In fact, as we shall endeavour to show later, these I>ogus confessions are one aspect of the work of Selbstinterpretation and Selbstbehauprung to which the later Heidegger devotes his entire writing effort
24 It is through strategies that are no less paradoxical - even though they take on the appearance of scientilicity - that the ’political science' which identifies scientific objectivity with 'ethical neutrality1 (Le, the neutrality between social classes whose existence it dentes anyway) contributes to the class struggle by providing all the mechanisms which help produce the false consciousness of the social world with the support of a false science.
25 Ultimately, there is no word which is not an untranslatable hitpax lego me non: thus the word ‘metaphysical*, for example, does not have the same sense for Heidegger that it has for Kant, nor for the later Heidegger the sense that it has for the earlier. Heidegger simply pushes an essentia] property of the philosophical use of language to the extreme on this point: philosophical language as a sum of partially intersecting idiolects can only be adequately used by speakers capable of referring each word to the system where it assumes the meaning they intend it to bear (‘in the Kantian sense’).
26 E. Junger, Essai sur Thomme et le temps, vol. 1: Traill du Rebelle (Der Waldgang^ 1951) (Monaco: Rochet. 1957). pp. 47-8. On p. 66 there is a perfectly clear although implicit reference to Heidegger.
27 ‘Authentic Being-one’s-ScIf does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the “they**; ft is rather an existentiell modification of the "(hey’' - of the “they'* as an essential existential (Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 168: cf. also p. 223).
28 Ibid., pp. 341-8 and 352-7.
