2 9 Ibid., pp. 3 801, 439M0 and 464-5.
3 (1 F. Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961L
31 W. Z. Laqueur. Young Germany: A History of rhe German Youth Movement (London: Routledge, 1962). pp. 178-87.
32 Stefan George’s style was imitated by an entire generation, particularly through the influence of the ‘youth movement* (Jugendbewegung), seduced by his aristocratic idealism and his contempt for ‘arid rationalism’: ’His style was imitated and a few quotations were repeated often enough - phrases about he who once had circled the flame and who forever will follow the flame; about the need for a new' mobility whose warrant no longer derives from crown and escutcheon; about the Fuhrer with his vdlkisch banner who will lead his followers to the future Reich through storm and grisly portents, and so forth* (Laqueur, The Politics of Cultural Despair t p. 135)
33 Heidegger explicitly evokes tradition - more precisely, Plato’s distortion of the word eidos-\n order to justify his ’technical’ use of the word Gestell: ‘According to ordinary usage, the word Gestell [frame] means
some kind of apparatus, e.g. a bookrack. Gestcll is also the name for a skeleton. And the employment of the word Gesrell [enframing] that is now required of us seems equally eerie, not to speak of the arbitrariness with which words of a mature language are so misused. Can anything be more strange? Surely not Yet I his strangeness is an old custom of thought’ (Heidegger. The Question Concerning Technology * p. 301). Against the same accusation of imposing ‘randomly arbitrary’ meaning, Heidegger replies, in *A letter to a young student** with an exhortation ’to learn the craft of thinking1 (M. Heidegger, ’The things’, in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper Colophon. 1975). p. 186).
34 E. Spranger. ’Mein Konflikt mit der nationalsorialistischen Regierung 1933’, Universitas Zeitschrtft fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Literatur. 10 (1955), pp. 457-73* cited by F, Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1969), p. 439.
35 J. Habermas. ’Pcnser avec Heidegger centre Heidegger*. Profitsphi/o-sopfuques et politiques (Paris: Gallimard. 1974), p. 90 (my emphasis). Cf. the revised version of this essay in English. Martin Heidegger: the great influence1, in Habermas s Philosophical-Political Profiles, tr. F. F. Lawrence (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 53-60.
36 Ibid., p. 100.
37 Heidegger, 'Building, dwelling, thinking’, p. 339.
38 M. Halbwachs, Classes sociales et morphologic (Paris: Minuit, 1972), p. 178. Il goes without saying that such a phrase is excluded in advance from any self-respecting philosophical discourse: the sense of the distinction between the 'theoretical' and the empirical' is in fact a fundamental dimension of the philosophical sense of distinction.
39 It would be necessary' - in order to bring out this implicit philosophy of philosophical reading and the philosophy of the history of philosophy which goes with it - to note systematically all the texts (commonly found in Heidegger and his commentators) which express the expectation of a pure and purely formal treatment, which demand internal reading, circumscribed by the text itself or. in other words, which express the irreducibility of the ‘self-engendered* work to any historical determination - apart, obviously, from the internal determinations of the autonomous history of philosophy or. al the must, of the mathematical or physical sciences.
40 It is not the sociologist who imports the language of orthodoxy: ’The addressee of the '’Letter on Humanism” combines a profound insight into Heidegger with an extraordinary gift of language, both together making him beyond any question one of the most authoritative interpreters of Heidegger in France' (W. J. Richardson, sj., Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1963). p. 684. regarding an article by J. Beaufret): or: ’This sympathetic study [by Albert Dondeyne] orchestrates the theme that the ontological
difference is the single point of reference in Heidegger's entire effort. Not every Heideggerian of strict observance will he happy, perhaps, with the author's formulae concerning Heidegger's relation to "la grande tradition de la philosophia perennis" ’ (ibid.).
