The Eurasian Century полностью

6.Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017), 327.

7.The general phenomenon is discussed in Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy versus Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

8.Nicholas Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power [1942] (New York: Routledge, 2017), 469.

9.Brian Klaas, “Vladimir Putin Has Fallen into the Dictator Trap,” Atlantic, March 16, 2022; Hal Brands and Michael Beckley, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Norton, 2022).

10.Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (Boston: Little, Brown, 1897), 259.

11.For useful critiques of these arguments, see Stephen G. Brooks and William Wohlforth, “The Myth of Multipolarity: American Power’s Staying Power,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2023; Øystein Tunsjø, The Return of Bipolarity in World Politics: China, the United States, and Geostructural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

12.Hugo Meijer and Stephen Brooks, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back,” International Security, Spring 2021.

13.John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 112.

14.Elbridge Colby, The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great-Power Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022).

15.Spykman, America’s Strategy, 165.

16.Elbridge Colby and Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Ukraine Is a Distraction from Taiwan,” Wall Street Journal, February 13, 2022.

17.It is also why defense spending remains nearly as low, as a percentage of GDP, as at any time since 1945. On the one-war strategy, see James Mitre, “A Eulogy for the Two-War Construct,” Washington Quarterly, Winter 2019.

18.George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1993).

19.This point was made to me repeatedly in discussions with U.S., Japanese, Australian, and British policymakers during conversations in these countries in November 2022.

20.Brooks and Wohlforth, “Myth of Multipolarity”; Jain and Kroenig, Toward a Democratic Technology Alliance.

21.Matthew P. Goodman, “Variable Geometry Takes Shape in Biden’s Foreign Policy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 19, 2021.

22.Halford J. Mackinder, “The Geographic Pivot of History,” Geographical Journal, April 1904, 436.

23.Author’s discussion with Vijay Gokhale, October 25, 2022.

24.The phrase is from “CIA Director Burns: What U.S. Intelligence Needs to Do Today—and Tomorrow,” Washington Post, July 7, 2023.

25.The exception is Iran, whose Shiite version of authoritarianism has historically seemed quite threatening to the Sunni regimes in the Gulf. On the broader dynamic, see Hal Brands, “Putin’s Saudi Bromance Is Part of a Bigger Plan,” Bloomberg Opinion, December 5, 2018.

26.John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

27.Case in point: China’s refusal to provide lethal military aid to Russia in the opening stages of the war in Ukraine in 2022 for fear of triggering U.S. and European sanctions. “China Not Giving Material Support for Russia’s War in Ukraine: U.S. Official,” Reuters, June 30, 2022.

28.“Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the Special Competitive Studies Project Global Emerging Technologies Summit,” White House, September 16, 2022.

29.Andrew Imbrie et al., Agile Alliances: How the United States and Its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI, Center for Security and Emerging Technologies, February 2020; Melissa Flagg, “Global R & D and a New Era of Alliances,” CSET Data Brief, June 2020.